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Abstract 
Based primarily on research into the policing of football fans in Scotland following the implementation 
of the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications Act (Scotland) Act 2012 this 
paper examines the interplay of police techniques and surveillance technologies in the policing of 
Scottish football. There has been relatively little academic attention directed towards the Act, so the 
question of why and how this flagship legislation generated such intense opposition that it was 
repealed within six years of its introduction demands investigation. This paper explores the 
implementation of the Act from the perspectives of football fans, criminal justice agencies, and 
representatives of football clubs, with a specific focus on the impact of police surveillance practices. 
The research uncovered strong perceptions that such practices were considered intimidatory, which 
may have weakened the perceived legitimacy of the Act. This paper poses a challenge to simple 
readings of evidence in terms of the claimed benefits of particular forms of surveillance, arguing that 
the use of technologies such as powerful hand-held cameras and body worn video (BWV) has had a 
detrimental impact on police-fan relationships, interactions and dialogue. 
 
Intro  
In April 2018 the first piece of modern Scottish legislation solely introduced by a majority government 
in Edinburgh was ignominiously removed from the statute books; formally repealed only six years 
after its introduction. The Act in question, the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening 
Communications (Scotland) Act 2012 (hereafter ‘the Act’), attempted to more effectively target and 
criminalise certain behaviours at football matches – such as offensive remarks, songs, chants or 
gestures made by fans – that could be perceived as hateful or likely to provoke disorder by a 
‘reasonable’ person. In particular, the Act was apparently designed to tackle offensiveness that 
centred on perceived religious background or affiliation associated with historical sectarian divisions 
in Scottish society.1  
 
Whilst a cynical commentator could argue that the main impetus behind the Act’s demise was that 
the loss of the Scottish Government’s overall majority in May 2016 simply gave opposition parties the 
opportunity to defeat the presiding Government over something. However, that this ‘something’ 
proved to be an attack on the 2012 Act cannot be seen as mere co-incidence. The Act was an ideal 
target precisely because it had attracted a growing and vocal range of opponents. Curiously, there was 
a level of initial support for the underpinning aims of the Act, at least amongst some fans. In 2014 a 
national survey undertaken as part of our evaluation of the Act, using a sample frame of fans provided 
by Supporters Direct Scotland, found that over 80% of fans were opposed to people singing songs at 
football that made reference to people’s religious background or beliefs or which alluded to political 
                                                          
1 The political and media rhetoric around the Act focused on sectarianism; however, it is notable that the word 
‘sectarianism’ – which has not been defined in law – does not appear in the text of the legislation. For a detailed 
discussion on how one might define the term see Advisory Group on Tackling Sectarianism in Scotland (2013). 
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support for terrorist causes (Hamilton-Smith et al., 2015: 38).2 By 2017, in a survey conducted by 
Supporters Direct Scotland using the same sample frame,3 whilst the majority of fans were still 
opposed to such behaviours at football, over 71% of fans opposed the Act as an instrument for 
achieving these aims (Supporters Direct Scotland, 2017: 5). The remarkable speed with which the Act 
generated such high levels of opposition demands explanation. Whilst much has been rightly made 
about the weak drafting of the Act and the extent to which the Act arguably merely duplicated legal 
remedies that were already available in Scots law (McBride, 2017: 237), less attention has been paid 
to how the implementation of the Act, specifically here in relation to the way in which it engendered 
intensified policing and surveillance practices, may have been a key factor in eroding support amongst 
fans. In turn this particular episode in Scotland sheds critical light on any empirical claims that specific 
forms of surveillance, such as CCTV or body worn video (BWV), can be reliably associated with 
particular effects. 
 
Football, policing and surveillance 
Football has long been associated with quite complex systems of surveillance and control. Haggerty 
and Ericson’s notion of the surveillance assemblage (2000) has particular relevance here, with their 
emphasis on complex, evolving and fluid systems of surveillance and counter-surveillance. 
Surveillance assemblages can be constituted by a mix of private, corporate and state resources, which 
for football, with its mix of police, club and broader corporate/public surveillance (including via 
televised matches) is apt. Consistent with notions of over-lapping surveillance purposes, the football 
assemblage traditionally incorporates tensions between surveillance for the purposes of fan safety, 
surveillance for the purposes of entertainment, and surveillance for the purposes of control. However, 
the balance between these purposes has arguably shifted significantly over recent decades with the 
emergence of dominant concerns of football disorder and ‘hooliganism’ (Stott and Pearson, 2006). 
 
The quintessential, dramatic figure at the centre of any historical narrative of football policing and 
disorder is the English ‘hooligan’. The football hooligan, so imagined, is an individual intent on using 
the sporting event as a pretext to access opportunities for collective acts of spontaneous or organised 
violence against fans from other clubs (Dunning et al., 1991). Despite the association of such disorder 
with English football, Scottish football has a longer and more troubled history with violence and 
disorder that pre-dates the emergence of the English hooligan, principally, but not exclusively, through 
the ‘Old Firm’ sectarian rivalry between Rangers, a club traditionally considered to represent a staunch 
British, unionist and Protestant identity, and Celtic, a football club generally regarded as a key site for 
the expression of Irish identities in Scotland (Bradley, 1995; Flint and Powell, 2011). Such sectarian 
disorder, however, became over-shadowed in the 1970s and 1980s by a UK-wide pre-occupation with 
hooliganism (Poulton, 2005), and specifically an upsurge in hooliganism in domestic and international 
fixtures associated with English teams (Stott and Pearson, 2007). It was this spectre of hooliganism 
that arguably dominated the shaping of policy and policing responses and tactics across the UK, 
irrespective of differences in more local contexts (Coalter, 1985; Bebber, 2012).  
 
                                                          
2 It is acknowledged here that the national 2014 Scottish Supporters Direct survey was skewed towards older, 
more conservative fans and under-represented younger sections of football ‘fandom’. 
3 The 2014 survey did not measure fan support for the Act itself, largely because it was considered that levels of 
fan awareness of the Act’s provisions and enforcement were too low at this early point to make any 
measurement meaningful or robust.  
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The political imperative to tackle hooliganism, stoked by suitably shrill media coverage, led to a 
considerable investment in police and criminal justice capacities to tackle the issue (Stott and Pearson 
2007). Significantly, enhanced policing in and around football fixtures was combined with greater 
restrictions on alcohol consumption, and with stadia security and safety enhancements that included 
the rolling out of comprehensive CCTV systems, which rapidly expanded after the 1989 Hillsborough 
disaster.4 Such security measures were generally operated by clubs, but with direct coordination with 
policing operations. Perhaps more significantly, the scale of the hooligan threat was perceived to be 
great enough to merit the adoption of policing strategies usually associated with addressing more 
serious security threats; measures that included the deployment of plain clothes police officers to 
work semi-undercover on match days; uniformed surveillance teams who might typically work with 
mobile cameras; and an extensive intelligence infrastructure, with football intelligence officers 
allocated to particular clubs, being supported in some cases with networks of football fans operating 
as covert police informants.5 
 
This escalation in conventional policing and surveillance resources was matched with a similar 
escalation in supporting legislation that targeted football disorder. The most radical example of this 
was the introduction in England and Wales in 2000 of football banning orders (Stott and Pearson, 
2006). Designed as preventative measures, banning orders imposed potentially draconian sets of 
restrictions on fans who were considered at risk of involvement in football-related disorder. 
Restrictions could include bans on international travel (through the surrender of passports), 
requirements to report to local police stations on match days or during tournaments, and stadia bans 
for periods that could, typically, last for up to five years.6 Additionally, banning orders could also 
include restrictions on movement that could extend to bans on going near specified stadia or into 
nearby city centres on match days (James and Pearson, 2006; Stott and Pearson, 2006). Whilst these 
orders could be imposed upon conviction, they were also frequently imposed on the basis of the police 
following a civil application process; thereby requiring only a civil burden of proof for an application 
to be successful (i.e. proof that on the balance of probabilities that an individual might be at risk of 
involvement in football disorder). These orders may be seen as a part of wider shift towards risk-
focused, preventative interventions in criminal justice (Zedner, 2009), and in their application within 
football have been persuasively critiqued as disproportionate and at odds with the human rights of 
fans (James and Pearson, 2015).  
 
Conversely, whilst similar policing and legislative resources were available in Scotland, they were used 
with restraint. For instance, whilst football banning orders were introduced by the Scottish 
Government in 2006, in part with the intention to tackle sectarianism (Flint, 2008), they were used 
sparingly, with no use being made of (arguably) more draconian civil powers (Hamilton-Smith et al., 
2011). The general focus of proactive policing strategies remained on violent disorder, which was 
                                                          
4 The official report into the disaster, the Taylor Report, made a number of recommendations to improve safety 
in football stadia. 
5The use of fans as informants is not well discussed in academic research, but has courted recent media attention 
in Scotland (see Evening Times, 2018). Despite a general academic neglect, this issue was discussed in interviews 
with police officers as part of the lead authors’ research into the Act and his previous research into football 
banning orders, wherein officers reflected upon the value of such covert assets in football policing. 
6 If an individual is convicted of an offence that dos not command a custodial sentence, the maximum football 
banning order period is five years, though, more exceptionally, if an individual receives a custodial sentence a 
banning order of up to ten years can be imposed (see Crown Prosecution Service 2019). 
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largely considered present on the periphery of match days in the form of organised fights away from 
stadia (ibid., 2011). In this context, policing and surveillance within stadia appeared to have become 
increasingly light touch, with CCTV systems and private stewarding arrangements being concerned 
with crowd safety rather than crowd disorder (O’Neill, 2005). Aside from assisting ground staff in 
maintaining safety, the role of camera systems was largely twofold: providing retrospective evidence 
if a serious incident unfolded, but also, more commonly, being used by police to record and 
corroborate their actions, namely by directing the cameras to a particular location in the ground if 
they were intending to make an arrest or eject a fan (Norris and Armstrong, 1999). Outside the stadia 
surveillance was largely concentrated on ‘high risk’ games, involving a mix of plain clothes police 
‘spotters’, who kept a watch out for known troublemakers (or ‘risk’ supporters in more contemporary 
police-speak7), and evidence-gathering teams with portable cameras who were tasked with 
monitoring fans. The value of cameras here was less in gathering evidence of actual offending, but in 
having a deterrent effect on fan behaviour (such policing teams being uniformed and especially 
‘overt’) and in helping compile information that was useful for updating the intelligence picture 
(O’Neill, 2005).  
 
One innovation in surveillance in Scotland came in the form of the move towards the adoption towards 
BWV technology, first introduced here by British Transport Police in 2015. The value of BWV for the 
police and Scottish prosecutors was seen to be not primarily along the conventional lines often found 
in the research literature: to bolster accountability, and/or de-escalating police-citizen interactions 
through moderating behaviours (Harries, 2010; Drover and Ariel 2015; Ariel 2016). Rather, BWV in 
Scotland was seen as useful for collecting supporting evidence. This was in cases where officers who 
were directly attending incidents that were in progress, used BWV not because video evidence was 
necessarily required to help establish guilt, but because when it came to subsequent legal proceedings 
being able to directly show the context of the offence was found to help secure a more appropriate 
sentence (Hamilton-Smith et al., 2011). In the context of football fans travelling to or from matches, 
being able to show the impact of that behaviour on others, which might typically play out in front of 
captive bystanders on public transport, was perceived as helping secure a more informed sentencing 
outcome. Overall, the policing of football in Scotland in the 2000s could justifiably be characterised as 
being relatively discrete, proportionate and light-touch (Hamilton-Smith and Hopkins, 2013). This 
relatively positive picture was to acquire more troubling hues following events in and around the 
football season of 2010/2011. 
  
The ‘shame game’ and the race to legislate 
In early 2011 a match between Celtic and Rangers sparked a period of heightened tension in relation 
to perceived sectarian behaviour following several on-field and touchline clashes between players and 
managerial staff. Despite of a lack of actual violence amongst fans, a moral panic ensued as the media 
obsessed over perceived ‘fan behaviour’. This match was subsequently given the moniker of the 
‘shame game’ and was regarded by some as representing the continued blight of sectarian division in 
contemporary Scotland (see Flint and Kelly, 2013). At the same time as this otherwise relatively 
unexceptional football match, a much more serious and on-going campaign of hate directed towards 
certain high-profile Catholics in Scotland – involving various acts such as online death threats and an 
                                                          
7 A ‘risk’ supporter is an official UK policing term defined by the College of Policing in England and Wales as: ‘a 
person, known or not, who can be regarded as posing a possible risk to public order or antisocial behaviour, 
whether planned or spontaneous, at or in connection with a football event.’ (College of Policing, 2018).  
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attempt to send individuals viable letter bombs – was also the subject of intense media focus. These 
egregious acts of anti-Catholic and anti-Irish aggression were, in early 2011, highly unusual; 
sectarianism in Scotland has tended to manifest itself in a far subtler manner (see McBride, 2018a). 
The decision to introduce legislation solely targeting football supporters was therefore contentious 
given that the incidents reported took place outwith the context of football and appeared to be 
characterised by anti-Irish and anti-Catholic sentiment as much as by antipathy towards Celtic football 
club. Nonetheless, the Bill was eventually passed by the Scottish Parliament on 14th December 2011 
and came into force on 1st March 2012. The Act was marked by opposition from the outset, and was 
the first piece of legislation to be passed in the Scottish Parliament without any cross-party support. 
Criticisms included that this was a knee-jerk and politically-motivated response, particularly given 
initial attempts by the presiding Scottish Government to pass the Bill as emergency legislation 
(Lavalette and Mooney, 2013). 
 
The study  
Our examination of police tactics and surveillance practices following the implementation of the Act 
is based on analysis of data drawn from primary research that involved two of the authors (Hamilton-
Smith and McBride, 2015), the doctoral research conducted by the second author (McBride, 2018b), 
and to a lesser extent from another earlier piece of research by the first author (Hamilton-Smith et al., 
2011). The main piece of research, from which the data analysed here is primarily drawn, was an 
evaluation of section one of the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications 
(Scotland) Act 2012 undertaken for the Scottish Government. Section one of the Act centred on 
making it easier to police and prosecute individuals for offensive hate speech or related behaviour 
(including offensive songs and flags) at a football match. The evaluation was commissioned by the 
Scottish Government in late 2012 with the aim of examining the Act’s introduction. The research was 
based on a mixed methods design, with fieldwork lasting from June 2013 through to early 2015. The 
fieldwork included a national survey of football fans undertaken in the summers of 2013 and 2014, 
circa seventeen and twenty nine months after the enactment of the Act (with 1,945 and 2,185 
responses in each sweep respectively); focus groups with football fans from multiple clubs; interviews 
with practitioners from criminal justice agencies, including the police service, the prosecution service, 
and the judiciary, football club personnel and other football officials; observational research both at 
and around football fixtures; and, finally, secondary analysis of a range of criminal justice data sources 
on arrests, charges, prosecutions, and disposals related to football. Limited use is also made here of 
similar interview and administrative data collected as part of an earlier evaluation into the use of 
football banning orders in Scotland, a work commissioned by the Scottish Government in 2010 
(Hamilton-Smith et al., 2011). 
 
Introducing the Act: shock and awe 
From the date of the introduction of the Act its provisions were rapidly utilised by police and 
prosecutors. This fast uptake should come as no surprise given the political investment in introducing 
the Act and the high-profile media attention that it attracted. Moreover, Scottish policymakers had, 
in contrast to the earlier introduction of football banning orders (Hamilton-Smith and Hopkins, 2013), 
come to appreciate the need for infrastructure, primarily resources and training, to support the Act’s 
successful utilisation. This preparatory work focussed on a number of important steps: 
 
 The extension of specialist prosecutors and appropriate police liaison arrangements 
to ensure that chargers were appropriately prioritised, evidenced, and supported 
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 The establishment of training programmes for key stakeholders, including club 
officials, to ensure that awareness of legislative powers, roles and responsibilities 
were clearly understood 
 The creation of a specialist football policing unit to provide national specialist 
resources, expertise, and training resources to ensure that nationally, the police 
responded consistently and effectively. 
 
The specialist football policing unit introduced alongside the Act was the Football Coordination Unit 
for Scotland (FoCUS). This new unit contained officers charged with overseeing policy and developing 
practice and associated training, as well as hosting an intelligence unit to consolidate and strengthen 
football intelligence. In undertaking its tasks FoCUS deployed surveillance equipment, including 
handheld cameras and BWV.8 FoCUS was introduced as police reform in Scotland was taking shape, 
and specifically the move towards establishing a single national police force that consolidated the pre-
existing structure (see Terpstra and Fyfe, 2014). FoCUS drew particularly heavily from one legacy 
Scottish police force for its staffing (Strathclyde Police, the largest of eight Scottish police forces 
preceding the formation of the national force, and the force from which the first Chief Constable of 
Police Scotland was selected). As a result, FoCUS become associated in the minds of many with a 
heavy-handed imposition of ‘Strathclyde’ policing methods and tactics that usurped the diverse range 
of pre-existing Scottish policing traditions, styles and richly varying community contexts (see Terpstra 
and Fyfe, 2015).  
 
This perception was reinforced by FoCUS operationally deploying officers to what they determined 
were ‘high risk’ matches, typically with the prominent use of surveillance equipment. At the same time 
the Act, and its early enforcement by FoCUS, was heavily publicised in the media. Again, on the one 
hand this may be seen as helpful in terms of making fans aware of the new legal powers9 and the 
heightened risks of continuing to engage in behaviour that might be defined as offensive. On the other 
hand, the rapid and high-profile use of the new powers, imposed by a cadre of ‘parachuted-in’ national 
officers (rather than familiar, local officers), was perceived by many fans as aggressive and 
confrontational. In particular, some early high-profile arrests, where suspects were arrested 
retrospectively at home via police ‘raids’ appeared to produce a sense of unjust, persecution amongst 
some groups of fans.10 
 
Being knocked at 6 o’clock in the morning to be arrested for swearing. That’s what 
happened to me. Now, I’m sorry, but that’s the things that the police are doing, arresting 
someone, a dawn raid at 6 o’clock, for swearing. (Football supporter, focus group) 
 
                                                          
8 As of early 2019 Police Scotland’s capability in relation to BWV is still uneven, with only certain police divisions 
having access to BWV capability. The numbers of devices also vary considerably between these divisions: ranging 
from single figures in Glasgow to over 300 in Aberdeen. As of June 2018 FoCUS had access to 22 BWV devices.  
9 83% of fans surveyed as part of the section 1 evaluation were aware of the Act, (Hamilton-Smith et al., 2015: 
34). 
10 These raids rapidly acquired the status of urban legend – accurate or otherwise – of being ‘dawn’ raids. Some 
arrests did occur in the morning. The perception of a particularly punitive approach was compounded by fact 
that some raids took place on Fridays, resulting in some suspects being held in custody over the weekend 
(Hamilton-Smith et al., 2015). 
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People talk about their doors getting crashed in. I understand that it’s about shock and 
awe, front page of the newspapers, and making sure that people are challenged, but is it 
proportionate to what’s trying to be achieved? (Club security manager, interview) 
 
Thus, from the outset, the way in which enforcement was publicised and pursued, arguably did much 
to formulate a sense of opposition, grievance, and victimhood from the outset.  Beyond official 
publicity, the sharing and recycling of stories via social media by fans themselves, both informally and 
via campaigning groups such as Fans Against Criminalisation,11 developed and sustained a powerful 
narrative of draconian policing and persecuted fandom.   
 
Disproportionality and the intensification of surveillance 
Section 1 of the Act introduced little that was new in terms of the legal powers available to prosecute 
offensive behaviour within the context of football (Law Society of Scotland, 2017); nor did the Act 
herald the introduction of new surveillance measures or technologies to target football fans. However, 
the Act facilitated a sudden step-change in the intensity and ‘reach’ of surveillance, and an increased 
willingness to use the full powers of the law to target more ‘marginal’ incidents of offensiveness. This 
was progressed through the creation of FoCUS, but also through strengthening prosecutorial expertise 
for identifying, handling and preparing cases charted under the Act. Judicial respondents were ready 
to acknowledge that in the aftermath of the Act, football fans as a group were subject to especially 
high levels of scrutiny and control: 
 
There’s no group of people more regulated than football fans. Can’t stand up, take drink 
in, drink in the ground, sing certain songs, all of these people [….] are under constant 
surveillance and they know that, the police know who they are. (Sheriff, interview) 
 
For some fans, and indeed for some sympathetic officials, the perceived harshness of the Act’s 
enforcement was facilitated through the ‘othering’ and vilification of football fans by the media and 
the general population. 
 
It was the way the media exacerbated football fans in general that led to the Act, and led 
to the vast majority of the population being in a position where they’d accept [it and its 
provisions]… because they don’t. I don’t think there’s that much of the population going 
to the football anymore. So it’s not going to affect them. If somebody brings an Act like 
that in, they’re [those who do not attend football matches] just going… “oh well”. 
(Football supporter, focus group) 
 
This touches on a perception of some respondents that disapproval from so called ‘armchair fans’, 
those watching the games on television, who were ready to be offended with displays of genuine 
fandom from a distance, was providing – at the very least – tacit political support for the Act. 
 
Targeting 
A general sense of disproportionality supported more specific instances of complaint around how the 
Act was being implemented and enforced, but also more fundamentally framed how different 
                                                          
11 Fans Against Criminalisation (FAC) was set up in 2011 to challenge the drafting and implementation of the 
2012 Act, and continued to campaign against the legislation until its repeal in 2018.  
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surveillance measures were perceived. The main driver behind the implementation and targeting of 
the Act during its first year in particular was the deployment of FoCUS officers. Which games FoCUS 
units chose to police, and more specifically how they chose to target potential incidents of offensive 
behaviour, was predominantly left to their judgement and not to the judgement of local policing units 
or local match commanders (though local commanders could request FoCUS assistance). This implied, 
in effect, a marked degree of central control over how the legislation was used, which led in turn to 
perceptions amongst fan groups that the targeting of the Act was a highly politicised process aimed 
at certain groups of fans and certain forms of offensiveness. 
 
The perception of unfair targeting extended to a sense that an excessive emphasis was placed on 
policing offensiveness within the stadia itself, whilst ignoring offensiveness across the wider match 
day ‘footprint’. In particular, there were accusations that whilst offensiveness inside stadia would 
frequently be monitored, wide-scale incidents of offensive singing were largely left unmonitored and 
unchecked in the pubs and bars that book-ended the match experience. To test these assertions, we 
deployed fieldworkers both to undertake non-participant observations in stadia and in pubs, but also 
to undertake short semi-structured interviews with bar staff to elicit their accounts of compliance with 
the legislation. Even with limited sampling the results were (somewhat comically) emphatic: 
 
We asked who policed the singing and the songs. The bar staff respondent replied that 
they ask people who are singing banned songs to leave the premises. “This is a Celtic pub, 
not an IRA pub” (Bar Staff). As the bar person was telling us that the singing of rebel songs 
was not tolerated in this pub the song which was blasting over the pub’s PA was the SAM 
(Surface to Air Missile) Song with the chorus of ‘ooh ah up the ‘RA, ooh ah up the ‘RA.’12 
We went on to ask whether they thought the Act was working. “We just work to the 
rules”. (Bar Staff) 
(Field notes extract, Monday 6th October 2014)  
 
Fieldwork on a particular match day, in a pub on the other side of the perceived sectarian divide, noted 
similar songs and singing (though no physical disorder). In all the pubs visited during fieldwork little 
evidence was recorded of formal or informal enforcement against such behaviour. 
 
Within the stadia there were marked discrepancies in the experience of different groups of fans seated 
in different stadia sections. This was illustrated in this focus group exchange, involving two younger 
fans and an older fan sitting in what was perceived to be a more respectable section of a stadium: 
 
Older Fan: I’m in [mentions stand at a football ground] at the halfway line and I can’t 
remember the last time I saw a policeman in the stand. 
Young Fan A: We’re searched every game. 
Young Fan B: When you come to [____] and you turn up [____] and walk up towards the 
[mentions stand], you’ll see two police officers at every turnstile. You’ll have a mounted 
police officer in front of them and you’ll be searched by multiple stewards before you go 
in. 
(Football supporter focus group) 
                                                          
12 ‘RA is short for IRA, the acronym for the terrorist organisation the Irish Republican Army. 
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Surveillance focussed on those sections of support – so called ‘singing sections’ characterised by more 
lively displays of fandom – that were often considered by some fans sitting elsewhere as central to 
the generation of an atmosphere on match day. Indeed, for some Scottish clubs these sections of 
support could be viewed as vital to their commercial success, with clubs attempting to accommodate 
them to increase their presence and commitment. Nevertheless, these sections were subject to 
increasingly intensive surveillance and heightened risk of sanction under the Act. So, a real tension 
emerged between policing offensive behaviour and maintaining an enjoyable, ‘competitive’ 
atmosphere.  
 
The younger group had become disillusioned, because one minute they are getting told 
‘let’s create a good atmosphere’, and then when they do that then getting told ‘you have 
gone too far’, so they were like ‘I am not going to the games any more’. (Football 
intelligence officer, interview) 
 
[A] lot of young kids will only go to various clubs because they want to go to the singing 
sections and those sections that can appear political. It’s colourful, its noisy, it looks fun, 
you want to go to that and it makes them want to go. If you calm that down then they 
won’t want to go. (Football supporter, focus group)  
 
An inherent tension here is that what constitutes an enjoyable competitive atmosphere centred not 
only on the quality of football on the pitch, but on songs and chants designed to antagonise or ‘wind 
up’ opposing fans. Such provocations can range from gentle humour to songs or chants that could – 
depending on the audience – be perceived as offensive. Thus fans become subject to simultaneous 
but contradictory forms of surveillance, watched both for entertainment and for offence.  
 
This intense selectivity in surveillance was ramped up further when it came to away games involving 
the key ‘risk’ teams (Rangers and Celtic), where the established logic that violent misbehaviour was 
always more likely from travelling fans was extended to a marked surveillance of a much broader 
population of fans out ‘on-the-road’ who were considered to be at risk of offensive behaviour:  
 
Fan 1: There was a pre-season game, went to [mentions football match], and FoCUS had 
turned up before the bus had even left Glasgow. Now, how they found out we still don’t 
know.  
Fan 2: This was five in the morning… They followed us from where we left in the bus, 
followed us to [mentions location] and then when we go to [English city]. It [surveillance] 
was the whole day.  
(Football supporter focus group) 
 
I’ve been filmed a few times, up in [____], one year I was right beside them [the police]. 
And I hardly got to see the game, I just felt so intimidated by the police, filming me the 
whole time. Right in front of you, we were right down in the second row and you just felt 
as though they were constantly watching you. It just made me feel really uncomfortable. 
(Football fan, interview). 
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The perceived consequences of focussing surveillance on sections of the stadium where younger fan 
groups were located was not only generating a collective sense of grievance and unfairness, but also 
potentially provoking the very acts of offensive gestures, speech and song that officialdom were 
looking to find: 
 
See just at that point, it is hard to say at young boys at 18, 19, 20, when they see that 
level of over-policing, that level of intimidation, it’s hard to tell them not to react to that. 
(Football supporter, focus group) 
 
 
Trawling and spear-fishing 
The use of a variety of surveillance cameras (from conventional CCTV camera systems to more recent 
innovations, such as long-range hand-held cameras and close-contact body worn cameras) in stadia 
settings was central to the enforcement tactics employed in support of the Act. At certain games 
teams of officers with cameras would generally direct their attentions towards sections of fans that 
were considered to be ‘high risk’. This strategy was viewed as provocative and intimidatory by targeted 
fans. The strategy was also seen as prone to highly inconsistent enforcement outcomes, where fans 
at home matches may unfairly get away with songs and gestures en masse that might be more readily 
picked upon when captured amongst smaller fan groups in away sections.  
 
And so you listen to this horrendous sectarian shit coming out, and nobody does anything 
about it. And then the next match… maybe Wee Joe Soap [a stooge or fall guy] who is 
sitting at the back makes some sort of, you know, vaguely sort of… statement that there 
might be sectarian, “We’ll arrest him, let’s go and get him, and we’ll be seen to put this 
Act in place!” But last week you let five thousand sectarian arseholes sing and chant for 
ninety minutes sectarian shit and nobody does doodly squat [anything] about it. (Football 
supporter, focus group) 
 
A further layer of discrepancy then arose in the determination of who, within a broader group of fans, 
should be subject to arrest and charge. Whilst misbehaving fans might have been more at risk of 
exposure and arrest at away games, even at larger home fixtures, individual arrests were made in the 
context of incidents where hundreds, or even thousands of fans, were actively participating in an 
offensive song or chant.  
 
Somebody is going to be the fall guy for that, but one person at a time is going to be the 
fall guy. (Football intelligence officer, interview) 
 
A sense of targeting on the basis of easy targets, in particular youth who were less discrete and/or 
more prone to getting particularly carried away, were viewed by many fans and by some police officers 
as being disproportionately liable to arrest and charge.13 
 
Cameras were seen as particularly instrumental to these dual processes of ‘trawling’ and ‘spear-
fishing’. Behaviours amongst sections of fans were often left to ‘play out’ with arrests following the 
                                                          
13 A perspective that was, at least superficially, supported in published official statistics, see Goulding and 
Cavanagh (2013) and Skivington and Mckenna (2014). 
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game once the police and prosecutors had reviewed footage and determined individuals whose 
behaviour were suitable to merit arrest; suitability here being defined not only on the basis of severity 
of behaviour but on the basis of being visible enough to support a successful prosecution.  
 
Um and I think that, in terms of the police, I think their ability to do that, um has been 
bolstered by the fact that they’ve now got prosecutors who they can run things past on 
Monday morning - you know, “we had this incident, here’s the CCTV footage, what do 
you think? Or ‘here’s the set of circumstances, so what do you think’?” (Prosecutor, 
interview) 
 
Whilst police and prosecutors might have seen such retrospective identifications and arrests as a 
prudent use of resources and to maintain officer safety, and a sensible way to ensure that charges 
were only made where they were warranted and likely to stand up in court, fans saw these self-same 
strategies as underhand and driven by a logic that gave primacy to achieving results and prosecutions 
over actually policing behaviour in the ground as and when it occurred. The increased availability of 
handheld cameras with powerful zoom and microphone capabilities were seen as exacerbating the 
situation, as officers could be so distant from fans that individuals could have no idea that they were 
being monitored. This led even some police officers to question the legitimacy and fairness of this 
approach: 
 
If you were sitting in a stand and I’m standing [in close proximity] with a camera in your 
face in full uniform you know why I’m here. If I am 50 metres away and you can’t see me, 
is it directed surveillance, even though they’re in uniform? (Football intelligence officer, 
interview).14 
 
Surveillance: the impact on fan-police interactions 
The difficulty for police was that whilst fans baulked at the initial deployment of very bulky cameras 
on the touchline as intimidating and provocative (an issue that even FoCUS officers acknowledged), 
the advent of cameras that were simultaneously both more compact and more capable led to officers 
‘standing back’, literally in the case of compact handheld cameras and perhaps more metaphorically 
in the case of BWV. Cameras became discrete to the point of invisibility, potentially engendering, in 
turn, a different form of distrust on the part of fans. In some senses this might legitimately be a case 
of ‘damned if you do and damned if you don’t’ in the context of surveillance technology being used to 
support a controversial piece of legislation. However, fan interview and focus group data would 
suggest that there was more to fan hostility than a simple dislike of any surveillance, big or small; 
rather, the context of how that surveillance use was intertwined with the broader style of policing in 
stadia seemed to be a key driver of disgruntlement.  
 
Fan 3: I think the problem with the coppers is they have no leeway. They cannae make 
decisions themselves in the ground, they cannae say to yous two ‘behave yourself, you 
can’t sing that’ 
                                                          
14 Under the UK’s Regulation of Investigatory Powers legislation, whereas routine ‘observation’ conducted in the 
course of a police patrol or during an event operation (like a football match) does not require authorisation as a 
form of ‘directed surveillance’, there is a point at which the duration and targeting of that ‘observation’ on any 
one individual, or group of individuals, might legally be viewed as a form of surveillance. 
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Interviewer: That’s a good point because some fans refer back to days of a bit more 
discretion 
 Fan 4: Common sense 
 Interviewer: Have you noticed a change in that? 
Fan 3: If you’re given a camera by your boss to go and film somebody you’re no’ just going 
to keep it in your pocket, you’re going to stand there and film and we think that’s where 
the problem’s coming from, they’re looking for it (Football supporter focus group, quoted 
in Hamilton-Smith et al., 2015:63). 
 
Respondents here picked up on a common theme of surveillance tactics leading to officers passively 
surveilling behaviour and failing to take action. Under previous practice, where discretion was 
exercised and more preventative tactics used, fans were often given verbal warnings, with associated 
opportunities for individuals or groups of fans to self-regulate and self-police before more formal 
police interventions were taken. 
 
 One interviewee compared her experiences of police at football matches in the past to changes 
in policing styles since the introduction of the Act: 
 
I remember the police being alright, I remember the police being… kind of having a laugh 
with you and, you know, if you were out of line they told you that. You know, just either 
‘sober up and leave the ground’ or ‘stop fighting’… it didn’t seem to be the underhand 
thing, it was very much out in the open, it was very much a relationship that the fans had 
with the police. (Football supporter, focus group) 
 
The research, consistent with the work of Stott and Pearson (2007), found common reference to fans 
self-policing in support of formal policing aims. However, it was also apparent that the perceived 
unfairness of police strategies in enforcing the Act led to other groups of fans engaging in counter-
surveillance strategies to undermine formal policing.  
 
We encourage younger fans to wear snoods [face-covering scarfs] … so they don’t get 
caught on camera singing anything cos you’re going to get jailed, simple as that. (Football 
supporter, focus group) 
 
This camera-driven style of surveillance was also claimed to reduce autonomy for frontline officers, 
who might now have to justify to senior offices any failure to act on the basis of recorded evidence. 
Some respondents linked these accountability pressures to the political nature of the Act and the 
subsequent pressures put on officers to make the Act a success.  
 
Interviewer: Do they [the police] actually come up and talk to you at all? 
 
Fan: They’ll never come anywhere near you, they’ll keep their distance and it’ll be filming 
the whole time. But I think that pressure doesn’t come from an individual or even a team 
basis in the police, it’s coming from higher up and it’s coming from government level. It’s 
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a case of you need to do this because this is now your job to do this. We need these 
arrests, we need these figures... (Football supporter, focus group) 
 
In the absence of routine contact between police and fans, the onus fell on stewards, often 
comparatively unqualified casual private labour used to provide security and crowd control within 
stadia, to directly interact with fans. Stewards had, even before the Act, taken on a more prominent 
role within Scottish stadia as clubs and police forces attempted to reduce policing costs (see O’Neill, 
2005). As was evident in our earlier evaluation of football banning orders in Scotland (Hamilton-Smith 
et. al, 2011), whilst stewards may have enacted a basic role in ensuring crowd safety and order, they 
did not necessarily have sufficient knowledge, capacity or motivation to deal with more difficult 
disorder within stadia. Low-levels of disorder nevertheless had facilitated a gradual scaling down of 
police officers, with officers being available, often waiting ‘backstage’ within stadia, if stewards did 
need assistance dealing with a more serious incident. 
 
With the advent of the Act however, this balance of roles between the police and stewards had, in 
part, shifted. With greater scope for officialdom to act on perceived offensive behaviour, and with the 
police often confining themselves to gathering video evidence of offensive conduct, the scope for 
stewards to take on a quasi-policing role had become enhanced, to the frequent concern of many fan 
respondents:  
 
They are essentially the police officers within the stadia and I don’t like that. In terms of 
someone that probably knows less about criminal law than I do, trying to decide whether 
I should be ejected from a stadia, sometimes physically. I don’t like it. (Football supporter, 
focus group) 
 
Given perceived ambiguities and variances in the understanding and targeting of the Act, the 
involvement of a highly mixed cadre of stewards appears to have further exacerbated a sense of 
grievance that the Act was being inconsistently enforced.  
 
For some police and fan respondents alike, an over-reliance on stewards and on the use of surveillance 
technology pointed to a need for more active policing, with the interaction of the Act and surveillance 
technologies being seen as leading to a disengagement and a concomitant lessening of the ability of 
the police to positively shape fan behaviour.  
 
The police have moved back and there is almost a non-engagement […] standing away 
from the support, filming the supporters, there’s been no challenge on the problematic 
supporters, their perception is that the police are away at a distance. (Club security 
manager, interview) 
 
You would rather be in a uniform… rather than following them with a microphone and a 
camera… it seems to be a case of ‘well instead of actually policing the situation we are 
just going to let them do what they want and then we are going to drag a couple of them 
out of their beds at four o’clock on a Sunday morning and drag them into court’… You are 
more likely to change your behaviour, change what you sing in a ground, if there are four 
of five police officers around about you in their full uniform than you are if there’s some 
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wee, snivelling bastard with a camera behind you. (Football supporter focus group, 
quoted in Hamilton-Smith et al., 2015:57) 
 
The logical outcome of surveillance technology here seems to have support Norris et al.’s original 
prediction that the trends in the use of surveillance in public order policing were liable to promote a 
shift from the active ‘preservation of public tranquillity’ towards more passive strategies based around 
post-event identification, analysis and prosecution (Norris et al., 1998:268)  
 
However, and although data was limited in our research, there was also some suggestion that counter-
surveillance strategies by fans themselves, could also have been aggravating this stand-off, with 
officers wary of intervening in situations where they too were being subject to camera surveillance.  
 
If they'd taken him out of the toilets and walked him out, and dealt with him out of there, 
it would have been fine. But they did it right at the bottom of almost of Exit 2 at ___ and, 
all of a sudden, this seems to be the big thing in modern society, out come the phones 
and everybody’s recording (Football intelligence officer, interview). 
 
As with the recording of fans by the police, the recording of police officers by fans was 
considered to have aggravated this situation, ultimately leading to more confrontation rather 
than less, with fans in this incident ultimately attempting to ‘rescue’ the fan from being 
detained, leading in turn to a violent confrontation with police.   
 
Beyond the stadia: further surveillance strategies  
In our evaluation of section 1 of the Act we interviewed a wide range of police officers involved in the 
policing of football, from frontline officers involved in stadia policing, through to senior police officer 
undertaking the coordinating role of ‘match commander,’15 as well as ‘spotters’ and football 
intelligence officers who often had more undercover roles, mixing with the crowd in plain clothes and 
collecting intelligence from informants. From our previous work on football banning orders, 
undercover and intelligence resources were purely targeted at pursuing ‘hooligan’ groups who were 
intent on organising violent confrontations with opposing fan groups. With the advent of the Act, we 
revisited many of these self-same officers for our evaluation of section 1, and what rapidly became 
clear was the extent to which these surveillance resources had been partially re-focussed around the 
implementation and the enforcement of the Act. Whilst some officials were relatively sanguine about 
this, others felt strongly that the Act actively undermined their ability to police violence. 
 
We have lost the upper hand when it comes to violence, and to me… whilst it’s abhorrent 
and totally wrong for people to be singing songs to each other, the big issue for me 
around about football is, is safety and violence…. and I think the balance there is slightly 
wrong. (Club security manager, interview)  
 
The capacity to address violence related not only to the practical diversion of resources to enforce the 
Act, but the extent to which that focus had soured relationships with more moderate fan groups who 
were being targeted for offensiveness. Conversely, more serious risk groups who were actively 
                                                          
15 Now known in Scotland as an ‘event lead coordinator’ 
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involved in violence, avoided any obvious acts that might lead them to being charged with offensive 
behaviour under the Act. 
 
The legislation’s not impacting on them, in fact I see them as more active towards each 
other. That isn't impacting on them because […names several ‘ultra-style fan groups…] 
they’re the ones that are getting themselves caught, so the older risk groups don't engage 
in sectarian singing because the way they see it is, ‘I’m not going to get caught for that’ 
(Football intelligence officer, interview, quoted in Hamilton-Smith et al., 2015: 65) 
 
In terms of the surveillance resources used, whilst we found no evidence that informants were used 
in this area at the time of the evaluation16 other undercover strategies, including the use of plain 
clothes officers and the monitoring of social media accounts, were clearly being ‘stretched’ or 
redeployed to focus on identifying offensive behaviours defined under the Act. This use of relatively 
‘high policing’ tactics and resources for addressing relatively low-level offences is marked, but perhaps 
not unreasonable given the emphasis on section 6 within the Act on targeting offensive comment and 
hate speech online, in particular within the context of fan forums. Nevertheless matters came to a 
particular head with accusations from Fans Against Criminalisation that possibly private social media 
accounts and/or telephone calls had been monitored and used to target police surveillance resources 
at their organised protests (leading in turn to complaints by the group to the Police Scotland, to the 
Police Investigations Review Committee, and subsequently to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal).17 
Regardless of the substance behind their particular complaints, the utilisation of sophisticated policing 
resources to pursue low-level incidents of fan offensiveness starkly illustrates the extent to which a 
political determination to robustly enforce the Act had led to a troubling extension of surveillance 
tactics. It remains unclear whether this drift was consciously centrally mandated, or whether it 
represented – consistent with Trottier’s (2017) characterisation of much police social media 
intelligence use – a bottom-up ‘drift,’ as police officers extended social media monitoring to this new 
area of police focus. 
 
Discussion  
With the advent of the Act in Scotland the tensions between the varying aims of policing and 
surveillance at football became more acute, as a previous focus on both crowd safety and on organised 
violence away from stadia gave way to a broader and intensified surveillance of ambiguously defined, 
and bitterly contested, acts of disorder and ‘offensiveness’ within stadia. 
 
 
This re-focussing of surveillance, on the back of much media and ‘armchair’ hysteria on behaviour in 
Scottish football grounds, seemed to represent a very corporate ‘re-casting’ of notions of risk, with 
risk being as much about reputational damage to Scottish football, as being about more tangible forms 
of crime and disorder. Correspondingly, the target was less on disorder and offensiveness in private 
or broader public settings (such as public bars), and more on offensiveness within particular 
commercialised and televised spaces (the stadia). In this new assemblage, there were apparent 
inequalities and perceived hypocrisy in the targeting of surveillance, with passionate fandom both 
                                                          
16 There has subsequently been accusations, reported on in the media, that police officers have been trying to 
recruit younger fans to report on the activities of their fellow football fans (see The Herald, 2018). 
17 Outline details of these allegations can be found here: http://fansagainstcriminalisation.blogspot.com/.  
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being nurtured and commercially desired, but simultaneously also being subject to draconian and 
rather capricious enforcement responses. Some commentators have also argued that particular class-
based prejudices have been played out in the interpretation and targeting of this Act, with working 
class expressions of fandom being deemed offensive by middle class viewers (Waiton, 2016). This is a 
view that resonates with the work of Coleman who sees public-private surveillance practices in the 
neoliberal city as being simultaneously pre-occupied both with the realisation of profit through the 
maintenance of conflict-free, sanitised civic spaces, and with highly selective dramatisations of deviant 
‘others’:  
 
 “…whereby the camera “objectivizes” the criminal, the deviant and the wrongdoer more 
often than not for the titillation, fear and entertainment of the ‘law abiding’ audience’ ” 
(Coleman, 2004: 300-301). 
 
The dramatic shift in the intensity and focus of surveillance was widely felt by fans to be 
disproportionate and unfairly selective, with surveillance concentrated on certain behaviours, 
amongst certain fans, in certain stadia, for certain matches. Through our evaluation there was clearly 
a strong sense of injustice felt amongst ordinary fans, and some anecdotal evidence that closer links 
were being forged between singing sections and younger fans, with long-established violent ‘risk 
groups’. This would be consistent with work of Stott and Pearson (2007) as regards to policing football 
crowds, as well Reicher’s influential work on the psychology of crowds more generally, and the related 
consequences of undifferentiated policing tactics (Reicher et al., 2004).  
 
The implications from these parallel areas of research are that if police strategies do not adequately 
differentiate between ordinary fans, and groups of fans intent on real organised violence, then 
otherwise law-abiding fans are less likely to support and co-operate with the police, and at worst may 
‘converge’ with some of these higher risk fan elements around a shared sense of injustice and 
victimhood. This convergence would appear all the more likely in circumstances where policing 
practices had the potential to indiscriminately catch and criminalise fans in a widening surveillance 
net, again resonating with the predictions of Armstrong and Norris: 
 
“Not only, therefore, is the net widened, but the potential for deviancy amplification in 
public order situations is increased. And as previously marginal demonstrators are caught 
up in the mêlée and subsequently identified, arrested and prosecuted, their fledgling 
deviant identities may well become entrenched.” (Norris et al., 1998: 269). 
 
Surveillance, and in particular the re-purposing of cameras and BWV technology to focus on 
offensiveness, appears to have been counter-productive. Whilst our original evaluation found that 
surveillance in certain key stadia deterred many from participating in offensive behaviour, cameras 
more broadly appeared neither to ‘moderate’ police-fan interactions or assist police in terms of 
boosting their legitimacy in enforcing the Act. On the contrary, the use of handheld and BWV cameras 
was viewed by some fans as provocative and symptomatic of the police stepping back from actively 
policing fan behaviour, through dialogue, challenge and positive influence. Cameras were there not 
only to surveil fans, but also to surveil the police; arguably inhibiting the use of discretion and common 
sense by frontline officers in keeping the peace, instead requiring them merely to ‘capture’ behaviours 
that could then be subsequently sifted for prosecutable acts of offensiveness. This impassive and 
unyielding form of surveillance may have deterred some fans from misbehaviour, but it appears to 
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have clearly provoked others, possibly producing the very offensiveness that such surveillance was 
intended to prevent in the first place.  
 
Recent analysis of other areas of policing in Scotland has noted similar processes. This ‘co-
construction’ of forms of offending between the police and the policed is ‘rooted in the interplay 
between people, practitioners, cultures, circumstances, practices, places, organizations and the 
systems that underpin such encounters’ (Schinkel et al., 2019). Importantly, this co-construction of 
offending is rooted both in developments before any encounter – including processes of intelligence 
briefing and risk assessment – and the nature of the interaction between the parties in the encounter 
itself. Under the Act we would observe a marked shift in the focus of policing manifest in both pre-
encounter targeting and surveillance, and in the quality and ‘feel’ of police-fan encounters within 
stadia. The ineluctable qualities of this co-construction are well-suited to explain the outcomes of the 
intense experiences of young Scottish football fans who feel that they are targeted, intimidated and 
over-policed, and who thus may react accordingly.  
 
In conclusion, it is worth reflecting on how our research findings appear to run-counter to much of the 
existing literature on the benefits of certain forms of surveillance. Camera technology that ordinarily 
may help soften police-public interactions in the context of poor existing relationships, may have had 
the inverse impact here in the context of relatively good pre-existing practices. In enforcing the Act, 
police officers, for many of our respondents, merely become distant and empty vessels for channelling 
the (perceived) oppressive gaze of the state. Going forward, these findings have particular relevance 
in Scotland given ongoing police discussion around increasing the use of BWV in frontline policing. Our 
findings also seem consistent with other research into Scottish policing, where attempting to improve 
police practices through imposing procedures that ignore the existing expertise and context-tailored 
approaches of frontline offices, can have surprisingly counter-intuitive and negative consequences 
(Macqueen and Bradford, 2017).18 Finally, this brings us, perhaps inevitably, into the orbit of Lipsky 
(1980) and his perennially relevant notion of street level bureaucracy; for whilst the good frontline 
officer may not be able to escape their obligation to uphold the powers of the state (Musheno and 
Maynard-Moody, 2015) they can, through the sensible use of discretion and negotiation, do much to 
legitimise that power and win co-operation and compliance from citizens.  
  
                                                          
18 MacQueen and Bradford attempted to replicate an Australian procedural justice experiment using a 
randomised control trial with Scottish traffic police officers, some of whom were given a ‘script’ to improve 
police-public encounters during traffic stops. 
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